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Five studies were conducted to (1) determine the roles 
which degree of interrelatedness (multiplex or simplex), 
level of trust (trusting and nontrusting), and size of 
penalty play in procedural preferences and to (2) 
investigate the use of the laboratory community for the 
study of dispute resolution. Interrelatedness alone was not 
responsible for producing differences in procedural 
preferences. Rather, it mediated the perceptions of the 
penalty and offense, with subjects in the multiplex 
communities perceiving the offense and penalties as more 
severe. Level of trust—regardless of the degree of 
interrelatedness—affected procedural preferences: subjects 
in the trusting communities were generally more 
nonadversarial than subjects in the nontrusting communities. 
Trust, however, interacted with the size of the penalty in 
two interesting ways. When subjects' perceptions of the 
offense and penalty were "anchored" by stating the offense 
explicitly and exposing subjects to all levels of the 
penalties, they became increasingly adversarial as the 
penalty increased. Subjects in both the trusting and 
nontrusting communities became more adversarial as penalty 
increased; however, subjects in the trusting community were 
always less adversarial than their counterparts in the 
nontrusting communities. When subjects' perceptions were 
not anchored—as was the case when they were exposed to only 
one level of the penalty—the size of the penalty had 
interesting non-linear effects on preferences. Finally, all 
five experiments produced understandable but different 
preferences and therefore demonstrated the success of a 
laboratory community for studying dispute resolution. These 
studies also support a person x situation interaction 
approach to an understanding of dispute resolution. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The social psychological examination of dispute 
resolution or of "justice" is conventionally broken up into 
two areas of study: procedural justice and distributive 
justice. Procedural justice is defined by its focus on the 
perceived fairness of the disputing procedures themselves; 
while distributive justice is defined by its focus on the 
perceived fairness of the distribution of the outcomes or 
goods which are achieved by the parties involved in a social 
relation (Lind, Kurtz, Musante, Walker, and Thibaut, 1980). 
This paper deals largely with the former. 
Following the seminal work of Thibaut and Walker 
(1975), most of the social psychological research on 
procedural justice has focused primarily on two different 
models of dispute resolution—the adversarial and 
nonadversarial models of judicial procedure (e.g., Houlden, 
LaTour, Walker, and Thibaut, 1978; Lind, Erickson, 
Friedland, and Dickenberger, 1978; Lind, Lissak, and Conlon, 
1983; Lind, Kurtz, Musante, Walker, and Thibaut, 1980; 
Thibaut and Walker, 1975, 1978; Tyler, 1984; Walker, Lind, 
and Thibaut, 1979). In the adversarial model, the 
disputants retain their own counsels—a fact which affords 
them a high degree of control over the presentation of their 
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individual cases. In the nonadversarial or inquisitorial 
procedure, on the other hand, a single judge and his or her 
agents retain control over the proceedings (e.g., 
presentation of the issues and evidence). 
Data obtained on procedural preference have shown that 
subjects, by and large, prefer the adversarial to the 
nonadversarial procedure, perceiving the adversarial 
procedure as the fairer of the two. Additionally, cross-
cultural studies in France and West Germany, countries whose 
legal systems are nonadversarial, also yielded similar data 
(Lind, Erickson, Friedland, and Dickenberger, 1978). 
Altogether, these findings led Thibaut and Walker (1975, 
1978) to conclude that the greater degree of process control 
and the greater perceived fairness inherent in the 
adversarial model is responsible for its greater 
attractiveness. Thus, this research indicated that control 
and perceived fairness are determinants of procedural 
preference. 
Thibaut and Walker's model was not, however, without 
its critics. For example, Hayden and Anderson (1979) have 
attacked it for, among other things, being culturally-biased 
and for restricting their analysis to those procedures used 
in advanced western societies. Although a generally valid 
criticism, it is, in some respects, an unwarranted one. 
Thibaut and Walker (1975, p. 117) stated that, "Our special 
concern has been with procedures for litigation in developed 
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societies [emphasis added]," thus, never purporting to have 
evidence for anything more than the evaluations and 
perceptions of these procedures in but advanced societies. 
Yet, critics of the model seem to be using this limitation 
as the means of evaluating the conclusions of the model, 
demanding that it include in its analysis non-western, 
traditional cultures and the procedures used in these 
societies. Nonetheless, despite the questionable basis of 
these criticisms (in regard to the Thibaut and Walker, 1975 
model), they do provide useful advise for further research. 
Anthropologists (Gulliver, 1979; Nader and Todd, 1978), for 
example, at the opposite end of the spectrum, examined 
diverse societies and collected data on a variety of methods 
of resolving disputes—processes which range from the tacit, 
uninstitutionalized to those which are institutionally-bound 
and sanctioned. Nader and Todd (1978) enumerated several 
different procedures, pointing out that these "...same basic 
procedural modes are used worldwide in attempts to deal with 
grievances, conflict, or disputes: adjudication, 
arbitration, mediation, negotiation, coercion..., avoidance, 
and 'lumping it'" (p. 9). 
Nader and Todd (1978), also discuss anthropological 
analyses of dispute resolution and suggest additional 
factors for consideration in a procedural justice model. 
According to the structural-functional approach to 
procedural justice, a crucial variable in determining 
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procedural preference is the complexity of the 
interrelations between the participants (and likewise 
interrelations within the community and the society in 
general). The structural-functional model specifies two 
types of relations: "simplex", single-interest relations 
and "multiplex" relations. Simplex relations are usually 
typical of more differentiated societies in which a person's 
relationship to others is confined to a single interest 
(e.g., doctor to patient, shopkeeper to customer, employee 
to fellow employee). Multiplex relations, on the other 
hand, are, as the term implies, more complex, and one finds 
members of such relations "connected" to each other by more 
than functional aspects alone. For example, in the 
multiplex relations of the Bartose society, "...nearly every 
societal interest serves many interests...The headman is 
related to his villagers by political as well as kinship 
bonds" (Nader and Todd, 1978, p. 12). Another 
characteristic of simplex relations is that they may also be 
less permanent than multiplex ones. Gluckman (Nader and 
Todd, 1978, p. 12) notes that, "This multiple membership of 
diverse groups in diverse relationships is an important 
source of guarrels and conflicts, but it is equally the 
basis of internal cohesion in any society." 
With regard to dispute resolution, the structural-
functional model predicts that disputants in multiplex or 
continuing relationships will choose procedures such as 
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negotiation and mediation—procedures which will lead to 
compromise outcomes and consequently to the maintenance of 
ingroup harmony. Conversely, disputants in simplex 
relationships will tend to choose procedures such as 
arbitration or adjudication, which are more likely to lead 
to win-or-lose decisions (Nader and Todd, 1978). Hence, 
this model and the reasoning upon which it is based attempts 
to examine and include other contextual variables which may 
play a role in procedural preference. 
Thibaut and Walker's model also began to be expanded 
upon by researchers in social psychology. For example, 
Thibaut, Friedland, and Walker (1974) attempted to examine 
other social determinants (specifically, the effects of 
correspondent and noncorrespondent relations) on compliance 
to rules. Cross-cultural studies conducted in non-western 
societies found that Japanese subjects, contrary to previous 
findings in Western cultures, preferred the nonadversarial 
procedure (Benjamin, 1975; Tanabe, 1963). More recently, 
Leung (1988) and Leung and Lind (1986) found that Chinese 
subjects from Hong Kong also preferred the nonadversarial 
procedure. Meanwhile, Earley and Lind (1987) suggest that 
justice judgment effects are not, as suggested by Thibaut 
and Walker's (1978) model, mediated by perceived control. 
Cross-cultural and other findings of this nature lead 
researchers to look for other contextual factors—perhaps 
cultural ones—to explain procedural preference. 
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Recent research points to an important cultural factor 
that may influence procedural preference (e.g., Benjamin, 
1975; Leung, 1988; Leung and Lind, 1986). According to 
these authors, preference for the nonadversarial procedure 
in non-western societies may be understood using the 
cultural dimension of collectivism-individualism. According 
to Hofstede (1980, 1983), collectivism is the "preference 
for a tightly knit social framework in which individuals are 
emotionally integrated" (1983, p. 295) into their group—be 
it an extended family, clan, or other social or racial 
group. Individualism, on the other hand, is the preference 
for a "loosely knit social framework in which individuals 
are supposed to take care of themselves and their immediate 
families only." Thus, while collectivism is characterized 
by a greater concern for in-group members and a greater 
likelihood to sacrifice personal interests to the welfare of 
the group, individualism is characterized by inner-
direction, self-orientation, independence, and personal 
achievement (Bond, 1984; Leung and Bond, 1984; Leung and 
Lind, 1986). People from individualistic societies (U.S., 
France, West Germany, Great Britain) have been found to 
prefer the adversarial procedure, while people from 
collective societies (Japan, Hong Kong) have been found to 
prefer the nonadversarial procedure. 
The relationship between the collectivism-individualism 
dimension and people's preference for different models of 
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procedural justice models remains to be clarified and 
examined. At this point, however, it is interesting to note 
some convergence with regard to work done on distributive 
justice (that is, the perception of fairness of the 
distribution of outcomes and goods). Deutsch (1975), in his 
analysis of distributive justice, proposes that different 
societal values underlie the preference for any system of 
justice. Deutsch asserts that people in societies in which 
economic productivity is of primary importance will use the 
equity norm as the dominant principle of distributive 
justice. On the other hand, people raised in societies or 
groups which place a primary value or importance upon 
maintaining harmony and good social relations will use the 
equality norm. And in a third case, members of societies in 
which both personal development and welfare are highly 
valued will use need as the principle of distributive 
justice. 
It is clear that Deutsch's first classification 
(societies which value economic productivity) corresponds 
roughly with the cultural dimension of individualism, while 
the second corresponds to the dimension of collectivism. 
The third classification (importance of both personal 
development and welfare) seems to correspond to aspects of 
both individualism and collectivism. In any case, if the 
norms of equity, equality, and need do in fact underlie the 
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systems of justice in different groups, then perhaps these 
values also affect procedural preference. 
Leung and Bond (1984), for example, suggest that in 
allocation of rewards an equality-based solution should be 
preferred by collective societies in which interpersonal 
sensitivity and harmony are highly valued and that an 
equity-based solution would be preferred by individualist 
societies which place a higher value on productivity, 
competitiveness, and individual achievement. They did in 
fact find support—though not unequivocal—that Chinese 
(collectives) subjects will be more likely in general to 
prefer and to allocate rewards using an equality norm, 
especially when allocating to in-group members. 
In the procedural justice literature, Leung (1988, 
Leung and Lind, 1986) examined different cultural variables 
which he believed affect preferences. He found that Chinese 
subjects, or collectives, tended to prefer the 
nonadversarial, animosity-reducing procedures more so than 
their American (individualistic) counterparts. He 
hypothesized that since ingroup harmony is important to 
collectives, they will actively strive to avoid 
confrontation with in-group members. And the nonadversarial 
procedure allows the disputants to avoid confrontation 
(since both process and decision control are vested in a 
third party) and thus to maintain harmony. Leung (1988) 
therefore suggests that in addition to Thibaut and Walker's 
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factors of process control and fairness, the factors of 
animosity reduction and favorableness must also be 
considered when determining procedural preference. He 
concludes that although collectivism is not directly related 
to procedural preference, its effect on preference may be 
mediated by the subjects' perceptions of the different 
models. 
In the present series of experiments we attempt to 
expand on this general line of research. The experiments 
reported and proposed herein address two equally important 
issues. One issue is methodological and entails the 
creation of a community (or "microculture") within which we 
will investigate procedural preference. The second issue— 
which follows from the first—is the examination of the 
different contextual factors which may add to our 
understanding of procedural preference and dispute 
resolution. 
The creation of a laboratory community may be achieved 
through a method conceptually similar to Walter Mischel'S 
(1981; Mischel and Peake, 1982) approach to the study of 
personality variables. For example, in his study of the 
delay of gratification in children, Mischel first identified 
variables correlated with the phenomenon (e.g., maturity, 
socioeconomic class, trust, social responsibility, etc.), 
tested these variables in the laboratory, and consequently 
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examined the person-by-situation interaction involved in 
this phenomenon. 
One possible interpretation of this research would be 
that Mischel was able to change behaviors reflective of 
seemingly stable personality characteristics, and his 
manipulation of the context yielded changes in this 
personality variable (i.e., delay of gratification). 
Perhaps a conceptually similar methodology may be applied to 
the study of cultural variables. In such a paradigm, 
culture would be the conceptual equivalent of the context—a 
"macrocontext" if you will. Each culture produces people 
with varied behaviors and preferences (e.g., perceptions of 
optical illusions, personal space, mother-infant 
interactions, sex roles, and procedural preferences). These 
cross-cultural differences can likewise be conceptualized as 
person-by-situation interactions, the results of which are 
not necessarily invariant nor immune to laboratory 
experimentation. 
In the cross-cultural literature, Triandis (1964) and 
Lonner (1980) discuss the results of research on perceptual 
responses, categorizations, and aesthetic judgments which 
support this type of conceptualization of culture. Triandis 
(1964, p. 13) notes that: 
Eriksen (1963), after a review of fifteen years of 
research, concluded that values, needs, and 
expectations affect only the responses that 
subjects make. Perceptual responses, according to 
Eriksen, are modified by both the frequency of 
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occurrence of a particular stimulus (the more 
frequent stimuli are recognized more easily) and 
by kind of previous reinforcements received in the 
presence of the stimulus. Therefore, according to 
this reasoning, the failure of members of one 
culture to observe an optical illusion which is 
observable by members of another does not mean 
that the perceptual systems or mechanisms of the 
people in these two cultures are fundamentally 
different. Rather, the inability or ability to 
perceive the illusion can be explained as a 
person-by-situation interaction in which 
familiarity of the stimulus may greatly affect 
perceptual responses. 
As an example, this type of reasoning may be applied to 
an explanation of the Mueller-Lyer illusion. Researchers 
found that non-Europeans are unable to experience the full 
impact of the illusion. According to the carpentered world 
hypothesis, the illusion is caused by the perception of line 
and angle peculiar to people growing up in carpentered 
environments and is therefore most vivid to these people 
(that is, Europeans and other members of western-influenced 
cultures). Likewise, and according to the reasoning 
suggested above, people living in non-carpentered 
environments may experience the illusion not with straight 
lines and acute angles, but rather with non-linear lines and 
curves—the more frequently occurring and therefore familiar 
aspects of their particular environment. A finding of this 
sort would demonstrate, at least in part, that both 
Europeans and non-Europeans have similar visual mechanisms, 
and that reinforcement, frequency of occurrence, and 
familiarity of visual experiences play a large role in our 
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interpretation of illusions and reactions to cues in the 
environment. 
This idea, as applied to the cross-cultural work on 
judicial procedure, would posit that variables affecting 
preferences may be identified and then tested in a 
laboratory setting. Through the manipulation of 
contextual/cultural variables and the examination of the 
resultant behaviors, we may be able to determine the extent 
to which cross-cultural differences are the result of 
person-by-situation interactions. If the key variables are 
identified, then manipulation of these variables should 
modify preferences, and, in essence, we should be able to 
evoke responses or behaviors found in another. Thus, in 
this manner, we should be able to achieve a laboratory study 
of the variables important to procedural preference. 
In sum, current cross-cultural studies of procedural 
justice are yielding intriguing data which beg further 
investigation. The present series of experiments is an 
attempt to extend this literature in two ways: (a) 
methodologically through the idea of a "laboratory 
community" and (b) conceptually through the controlled 
testing of different variables which may affect preferences. 
In Experiments 1-3, we examined the effects of three 
different variables on preferences: degree of 
interrelatedness of ingroup relationships, degree of 
interpersonal and community trust, and severity of the 
penalty associated with a guilty verdict. In Experiments 4 
and 5 we investigated the effects of these three variables 
on the perceptions of the severity of the penalty and 
offense. 
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CHAPTER II 
EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2 
Introduction 
In experiments 1 and 2, one of our primary interests 
was the creation of different communities in the laboratory. 
Two variables—degree of interrelatedness and level of 
trust—were manipulated to create the two different types of 
communities of interest: a cooperative, neighborly 
community and a competitive, self-serving one. 
According to the structural-functional model (Gulliver, 
1979; Nader and Todd, 1978), the nature of the 
interrelations among the members of a culture play a large 
part in determining how disputes are resolved. This model 
predicts that members of societies characterized by 
multiplex relations (in which members are highly 
interrelated by complex relational connections) would be 
more likely to choose dispute resolving procedures which 
lead to compromise outcomes and which therefore do not 
threaten the fabric of these relations. On the other hand, 
members of societies characterized by "simplex relations" 
(i.e., "simple" relations which are largely confined to a 
single interest)—possibly because of the lack of relational 
and social interconnections—will be more likely to choose 
win-or-lose procedures to settle disputes. 
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In other words, knowing that one will interact with the 
same people in the same group for much of one's life may 
greatly influence the type of legal actions one takes; and 
in communities typified by multiplex relations, it becomes 
important to maintain harmonious relations with one's 
ingroup. (Additionally, it may be important to note that in 
a close-knit, long-standing community, any crime or 
deviation from the community's standard may be perceived as 
a threat to a peaceful existence as well as a serious breach 
of community values.) In Experiment 1, we introduced a 
highly interrelated community. We maximized interrelations 
by making the communities long-standing, which in turn had 
the effect of decreasing intergroup mobility. And in 
Experiment 2 we created a simplex community—one which was 
not long-standing and thus less interrelated. 
While interrelatedness may be one possible determinant 
of procedural preferences, other research on procedural 
justice (Leung, 1988; Leung & Lind, 1986) suggests that 
aspects of the collectivism-individualism dimension may 
mediate preferences. For example, one distinction between 
collective, group-oriented and individualistic, self-
oriented cultures is the importance placed on the 
maintenance of the group and thereby on harmonious, trusting 
relations among group members. Since collective and 
individualistic societies may differ with regard to the 
value placed on interpersonal relationships, we examined the 
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hypothesis that one dimension on which collective societies 
differ from individualistic societies is that of 
interpersonal trust. Thus, in Experiments 1 and 2 we 
attempted to create our two different communities by 
manipulating (in addition to the degree of interrelatedness) 
the degree of trust existing between the participants in the 
legal dispute and within the community in general; creating 
one community more cooperative and trusting in nature and 
another, the nontrusting one, more self-serving and highly 
competitive. 
According to a structural-functional analysis 
(Gulliver, 1979; Nader & Todd, 1978), the degree of 
interrelatedness is important in determining procedural 
preferences; however, according to our interpretation of the 
collectivism-individualism dimension, interpersonal trust 
may provide an explanation for the cross-cultural 
differences found in procedural preferences. Whether these 
differences in preferences are explicable from the 
perspective of interrelatedness or from the dimension of 
trust is not clear. We therefore examined both factors in 
relation to each other. Experiment 1 examined trust in 
multiplex communities, while Experiment 2 examined trust in 
simplex communities. We attempted to assess the effects of 
these communities by producing differences in subjects' 
procedural preferences. In other words, we wished to 
develop contexts which might induce our subjects to respond 
to dispute situations in ways not typically American (i.e., 
by demonstrating preferences other than the adversarial). 
The third variable which we examined within this 
paradigm was that of the magnitude of the penalty. Unlike 
the first two variables, the magnitude of the penalty was 
not instrumental in the creation of the communities per se, 
but was more directly related to aspects of the dispute 
itself. The "penalty" associated with a dispute is one type 
of cost. And anthropological approaches (Nader and Todd, 
1978) suggest that "cost"—whether it is sociological or 
psychological (e.g., social stigma attached to the 
implication of having committed a transgression, social 
stigma attached to either engaging or not engaging in the 
disputing process) or economic (e.g., loss due to an 
unfavorable ruling, physical distance from court, loss of 
hourly wage, etc.)—is a factor which should be considered 
in analyses of dispute resolution. Experiments 1 and 2, 
therefore, also tested the effect of the magnitude of the 
penalty on procedural preference. 
In sum, Experiments 1 and 2 were undertaken to assess 
the creation of a laboratory community and specifically to 
test the effects of (1) the degree of interrelatedness 
(multiplex vs. simplex), (2) the level of trust in the 
community, and (3) the effects of the magnitude of the 
penalty on procedural preferences. Based on the analyses 
discussed above (Gulliver, 1979; Leung, 1988; Leung & Lind, 
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1986; Nader & Todd, 1978), we can make the following 
predictions for each of the three variables. For the 
variable of interrelatedness, we predict that since the 
maintenance of harmony is relatively more important to 
members of multiplex than to members of simplex communities, 
subjects in the multiplex community should choose to resolve 
disputes in a non-confrontational manner. 
For the variable of trust, we would predict that 
subjects in the trusting community will prefer the 
nonadversarial procedure over the adversarial. This may be 
due to the overall confidence in and willingness to give up 
personal control which subjects in the trusting communities 
have relative to those in the nontrusting communities. 
Finally, for the variable of penalty, one prediction 
might be that as consequences are increased, the defendants 
will be more likely to use a tit-for-tat strategy in which 
they become increasingly adversarial as the penalty—and 
hence, by implication, the aggressiveness of the accuser— 
increases. However, we may also find penalty x trust 
interactions. For example, despite increases in the 
severity of the penalty in a trusting community, defendants 
may continue to act to reduce the potential for 
confrontation by choosing more cooperative, animosity-
avoiding ways of resolving the dispute. Subjects in the 
nontrusting communities, however, may react to the 
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increasing severity of the penalty by becoming increasingly 
adversarial. 
Method (Experiment 1) 
Subjects and Design 
144 female students from the introductory psychology 
class at the University of North Carolina-Greensboro 
participated in the study in return for experimental credit. 
The design included two levels each of two between-group 
factors: trust and penalty associated with a guilty 
verdict. All four communities were multiplex in nature. 
Repeated measures were taken on the procedural variable 
(adversarial, nonadversarial). 
Materials 
The materials consisted of a single packet of 
descriptions and questions. Page one of the packet 
contained the description of one of four different 
communities or scenarios: one trusting community with a low 
penalty associated with a guilty verdict, another trusting 
community with a high penalty associated with a guilty 
verdict, the third community was nontrusting with a low 
penalty, and the fourth community was nontrusting with a 
high penalty associated with a guilty verdict. (Of note is 
that the descriptions of the communities represent extreme 
scenarios. Hence, the descriptions of both the trusting, 
cooperative and cohesive community, and the nontrusting, 
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competitive and self-serving community are pronounced and 
extreme.) (See Appendix A for the materials.) 
The next two pages of the packet included the 
descriptions of the two hearing procedures: adversarial 
(labelled "L") and nonadversarial (labelled "J"). The order 
of presentation of the two procedures was counterbalanced. 
The general format of the descriptions of the offense and 
legal procedures ("J" and "L") were adapted from Leung and 
Lind (1986). (See Appendix B for the descriptions of the 
hearing procedures.) 
The next page in the packet of experimental materials 
assessed the subjects' preferences for the hearing 
procedures. The subjects were asked to rate their 
preference for each procedure using a 20-point scale with 
the stipulation that each procedure be assigned a unique 
rating (forced choice). The next page of the packet, once 
again as per Leung and Lind (1986), included an open-ended 
question which asked subjects to explain their evaluations 
of the three procedures. Next, there were ten more 
questions, also adapted from Leung and Lind (1986), which 
asked the subjects to indicate: how much they felt each 
procedure favors them, how likely they think each procedure 
will lead to a workable settlement, to what extent each 
procedure provides them with the opportunity to present 
evidence, provides their opponent with the opportunity to 
present evidence, how fair the procedures are, how much 
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control the judge has over the presentation of evidence, how 
much control the subject has over the evidence, how much 
control their opponent has over the evidence, how likely it 
is that the procedures will result in a fair outcome, and 
how likely it is that each procedure will represent the true 
facts of the case. The subjects indicated their answers by 
rating the procedures in each question using a 2 0-point 
scale. 
Procedure 
Subjects were run in a large classroom in groups of 12 
to 20 students. After being seated, the experimenter handed 
them a packet of materials which described a legal dispute 
and then instructed them to read the packet carefully and to 
try to imagine themselves in the situation described. 
Subjects were then told to read the hearing procedures 
carefully and to feel free to flip around to any portion of 
the packet in order to answer the questions at the end of 
the packet. Subjects were debriefed and thanked at the end 
of the experiment > 
Method (Experiment 2) 
Subjects and Design 
120 female students from the introductory psychology 
class at the University of North Carolina-Greensboro 
participated in the experiment in return for credit. All 
communities were simplex in nature. The design was a 2 x 2 
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x 2 between and within design. The two between-subjects 
factors were trust (low and high) and magnitude of penalty 
associated with a guilty verdict (low and high). Subjects' 
procedural preferences (adversarial and lionadversarial) were 
the within-subjects factor. 
Materials 
The materials were presented in a packet identical to 
that in Experiment 1 except for a single modification. The 
following two lines were deleted from the beginning of the 
text in order to decrease the interrelatedness of the 
communities; "We would like you to imagine that you have 
grown up and plan to remain in the community which is 
described below. It is a rather small community and you 
know and are known to most of its members." These sentences 
were replaced with the following, "We would like you to 
imagine that you are a member of the following community." 
The questions which followed the description of the two 
legal procedures (whose order was counterbalanced) were 
identical to those in Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
Subjects were run in a large classroom in groups of 
approximately 15 to 20 each. They were seated four each 
around a long rectangular table. The instructions were 
identical to that of Experiment 1. 
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Results and Discussion (Experiments 1 and 2) 
For Experiment 1, the analysis of variance for 
procedural preferences revealed the following significant 
effects: a main effect of trust F(l, 140)= 12.92, p < 
.0005; a main effect of procedure (adversarial vs. 
nonadversarial) F(l, 140)= 68.88, p < .0001; and a procedure 
x trust interaction F(l, 140)= 6.60, p < .02. This 
significant interaction indicates that subjects in the 
nontrusting communities preferred the adversarial procedure 
("L") more than they preferred the nonadversarial procedure 
("J") in both low- and high-penalty conditions. 
Subjects in all communities preferred the adversarial 
procedure to a relatively greater degree than the 
nonadversarial procedure; however, subjects in the trusting 
communities preferred the nonadversarial procedure (in both 
penalty conditions) relatively more than subjects in the 
nontrusting communities (both low- and high-penalty 
conditions). In other words, subjects in both trusting 
communities (that is, either high or low in objective 
penalty) preferred the nonadversarial procedure more than 
their counterparts in both of the nontrusting communities. 
Thus, interrelatedness seems to have mitigated the 
effects of the magnitude of the penalty; however, it was not 
responsible for all the differences which were found in 
preferences. Of relevance is the fact that subjects in the 
nontrusting, multiplex communities preferred the 
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nonadversarial mode of dispute resolution to a much lesser 
degree than did their counterparts in the trusting 
communities—showing instead a relatively greater preference 
for the adversarial procedure. This is an indication that 
the effect of context on preferences does not seem to have 
been limited to the variable of interrelatedness alone. 
Specifically, if the type of interrelatedness alone were 
responsible for differences in preferences, then we should 
have found no differences in preferences between the 
trusting and nontrusting communities. 
The analysis of variance for Experiment 2 revealed a 
significant main effect for trust F(l, 116)= 5.32, p < .03 ; 
and for procedure (J or L) F(l, 116)= 73.25, p < .0001. 
These main effects were, however, qualified by two 
interactions. The first was a marginally significant 
procedure x penalty interaction F(l, 116)= 3.91, p < .051; 
in which preferences for the adversarial procedure decreased 
as the penalties increased, and preferences for the 
nonadversarial procedure increased as the size of the 
penalty increased. The second significant interaction was 
a procedure x trust x penalty interaction F(l, 116)= 5.0, p 
< . 03. 
According to this three-way interaction, subjects in 
the nontrusting communities preferred the adversarial 
procedure more than they preferred the nonadversarial— 
regardless of size of the penalty. On the other hand, 
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subjects in the trusting and high-penalty community 
preferred the nonadversarial procedure relatively more and 
the adversarial procedure relatively less than subjects in 
any of the other three communities (including the trusting, 
low-penalty condition). In other words, subjects in the 
trusting high-penalty community preferred the nonadversarial 
procedure relatively more than subjects in the trusting and 
low-penalty community—who preferred the adversarial 
procedure. (The means for subjects' procedural preferences 
are depicted in Table 2.) 
It seems that interrelatedness (multiplex or simplex) 
alone is not responsible for predicting the manner in which 
disputes are resolved—as the structural-functional model 
might predict. Instead, in the present studies, 
interrelatedness interacted with the level of trust in 
determining procedural preferences. Additionally, some 
aspect of interrelatedness may also have mediated the effect 
of "penalty"—for whereas in the multiplex communities we 
obtained no effect of penalty, we were able to find 
significant penalty interactions in the simplex-type 
communities. 
Furthermore, what is particularly interesting is the 
apparent absence of a "tit-for-tat" type strategy (in both 
Experiments 1 and 2) with respect to increases in the size 
of the penalty. Specifically, none of the subjects in any 
of the communities (trusting or nontrusting, multiplex or 
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simplex) became more adversarial as the penalty associated 
with a guilty verdict increased. In fact in the trusting 
and simplex community of Experiment 2, subjects were 
actually less adversarial in the high-penalty condition 
relative to the low-penalty condition. 
Perhaps the perception of the severity of the offense 
or transgression may have been affected by the size of the 
penalty (and hence by interrelatedness as well). For 
example, a higher penalty may be an indication that a more 
severe transgression was committed. Thus, in the simplex, 
trusting communities, we find an interesting penalty effect 
which may be due in part to the fact that the offense in the 
high-penalty condition may have been perceived as being more 
severe than the supposed offense committed in the low-
penalty condition. As such, we may be comparing the 
procedural preferences of people who have committed 
different crimes in very different contexts (as it seems 
possible that many aspects of the scenario may be changing 
with differences in the penalty). 
By the same token, if offenses committed in multiplex 
communities are perceived as relatively more severe than 
those committed in simplex communities, then, by 
implication, so too may be the penalties. This is 
evidenced, in part, by the fact that we found no significant 
effect for the size of the penalty in the multiplex 
communities, but instead found significant penalty 
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interactions in the simplex communities. Perhaps 
"interrelatedness" may have mitigated the effect of the 
penalty in that all penalties in the multiplex communities 
were perceived as relatively severe. For example, in 
multiplex societies in which there is a high degree of 
interrelatedness any transgression posing a threat to the 
relative harmony of the group—no matter how large or small-
-may be perceived as relatively severe. Thus, in these 
communities, the penalties or consequences may not have been 
perceived as being very different from each other. And if 
in multiplex communities more or less severe transgressions 
are seen as having equally severe consequences, one would 
expect the members of these groups to behave similarly with 
regard to a wide range of penalties—judging the entire 
dispute situation according to social standards that are not 
solely determined by the personal, material costs incurred 
by potential loss. 
In sum, given the data obtained in Experiments 1 and 2, 
it seems that subjects' perceptions of the offense and of 
the penalty may have been differentially affected by the 
interrelatedness of the community and level of trust. 
Experiments 3, 4, and 5 were designed to explore these 
hypotheses. In Experiment 3 we tested these assumptions by 
(1) anchoring subjects' perceptions of the penalty and (2) 
anchoring perceptions of the offense by making it explicit. 
Experiments 4 and 5 we tested subjects' perceptions of 
offense and of the penalty. 
29 
CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENTS 3, 4, AND 5 
Introduction 
As we have shown in Experiments 1 and 2, any legal 
issue or dispute takes place within an entire social 
context. Decisions of how one should proceed are based upon 
many different aspects of one's social context. Hence, a 
familiarity with the advantages of different hearing 
procedures will not in and of itself be sufficient to 
predict what or how a person will choose to settle a 
dispute. It is safe to assume that, once accused of an 
offense or transgression, the defendant may do any one (or 
all) of the following: search him/herself to decide whether 
there is justification for the accusation (if the charge is 
not, in fact, clear) , search his/her social context to 
ascertain the aggressiveness of his/her accuser, attempt to 
find out the exact severity of the supposed offense (other 
than those "moral" transgressions for which there are more 
clear-cut judgments of their severity), attempt to determine 
the nature of the legal system and legal aid, find out what 
one might potentially lose or what one is legally liable 
for, etc. 
Ascertaining the relative severity of the transgression 
and the reasonableness of the demanded compensation may be 
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influenced by the nature of one's judicial system. The 
American judicial system, unlike that of France or West 
Germany, is based on precedents (Thibaut and Walker, 1975)— 
cases which are brought to court are decided upon by 
comparing the case in question to previous similar cases. 
Hence, this type of system is based not so much on absolute 
judgments of right or wrong, but on what judgment was made 
previously in a similar case. When litigating, it is not 
uncommon for the participants in cases to probe and seek 
advice to ascertain the size of the compensation the accuser 
should ask for or what the defendant is justifiably 
responsible for. These issues are addressed both before and 
during the courtroom proceedings. Whether this type of 
probing is the by-product of our particular justice system 
or whether these are processes in which all people engage, 
no matter what their legal orientation, is not known. 
However, these factors are important to litigants when 
deciding how to proceed with a case. As discussed above in 
Experiments 1 and 2, presenting the dispute within a social 
context may not have been sufficiently explicit with regard 
to information of the severity of the offense and what a 
reasonable penalty should be. Experiment 3 provides more 
specific information about the offense in the context of a 
within-subjects design. The within-subjects design should 
enable us to anchor the severity of offense as well as to 
provide more information about the potential penalties 
associated with the it. 
This type of design would accomplish the anchoring of 
offense and penalty by enabling the subject to interpret all 
the penalty scenarios in relation to each other. Hence 
subjects are able to see (1) what the offense could 
potentially mean in terms of size of compensation (and by 
implication, what the offense means to the accuser), (2) 
what constitutes a reasonable versus an unreasonable 
request, and (3) that the same offense is being litigated in 
each penalty condition. Once the offense is anchored by 
making it explicit and allowing subjects to understand it in 
relation to several different levels of demands for 
compensation, subjects should be able to make clearer 
interpretations of the legitimacy of the dispute and (or in 
relation to) the aggressiveness of the accuser. Hence, we 
might find defendants matching the aggressiveness of their 
accuser by becoming increasingly adversarial themselves. 
In other words, when subjects in a within-subjects 
design are able to see the penalties in relation to a more 
explicit offense and in relation to each other, we may 
expect to see an overall tit-for-tat (or matching) strategy 
used; wherein defendants become increasingly adversarial 
with the perceived increasing aggressiveness of the accuser 
(increases in penalty). We should not, however, see this 
same pattern of responding on a between-groups design (as in 
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Experiments 1 and 2) because of the shifting perceptions of 
the severity of the offense and (by implication) the meaning 
of the penalty. And, in fact, we did not find subjects 
using this matching strategy in those studies. Apparently, 
then, when the perceptions of the offense and penalty are 
not anchored (as in a between-groups design), it becomes 
difficult to predict subjects' responses to dispute 
situations, because it is difficult to determine whether 
subjects are reacting to what they perceive as the 
aggressiveness of the accuser or the severity of the 
offense. Additionally, whether this matching strategy will 
be used in both the trusting community as well as in the 
nontrusting community is not clear. 
Method (Experiment 3) 
Subjects and Design 
76 female students from the introductory psychology 
class at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
participated in the study in return for experimental credit. 
The design included the between-groups factor of trust (low 
and high) and the two within-subjects factors of size of 
compensation or penalty (low, moderate, and high) and 
procedural preference (adversarial and nonadversarial). 
Materials 
The materials, once again, consisted of a single packet 
of descriptions and questions. The first page of the packet 
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described either of two different communities: one trusting 
and the other nontrusting. Both communities were simplex in 
nature. The descriptions of the communities were the same 
as those used in Experiments 1 and 2; however, this time the 
offense was made explicit. Subjects read that they had been 
accused of infringing upon someone else's business property 
by failing to trim and take care of the (the defendant's) 
shrubbery which grows on the border of the business 
properties. 
Pages 2 and 3 of the packet included the descriptions 
of the two hearing procedures (adversarial and 
nonadversarial). The next three pages of the packet 
included, on each page, the description of one of the three 
levels of compensation for the supposed offense (in the low 
penalty condition the subject paid 25% of the fees; in 
moderate, the subject paid all the fees; and in high, 
subject was sued for the property upon which the trees and 
shrubs grew). The description of the penalty (compensation) 
was followed by questions which assessed the subjects' 
preferences for the two hearing procedures. The 
presentation of the penalty descriptions was counterbalanced 
so that each penalty condition appeared in the first, 
second, and third position a third of the time. 
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Procedure 
Subjects were run in a large classroom in groups of 12 
to 3 0 students. After being seated, the experimenter handed 
the subjects a packet which described a legal dispute and 
then instructed them to read each scenario carefully and to 
try to imagine themselves in the situations described. The 
subjects were debriefed and thanked at the conclusion of the 
experiment. 
Results and Discussion (Experiment 3) 
Two different analyses were performed on these data. 
The first analysis was performed on the measures of 
procedural preferences for only the responses to the first 
penalty scenario of every packet. In other words, although 
each subject experienced every level of the penalty, the 
present analysis looked only at their first response—i.e., 
at only one level of the penalty per each subject. Only one 
significant effect was found for level of trust F(l,70) = 
5.50, p < .03. However, an analysis of variance performed 
on only the low- and moderate-penalty conditions (this 
comparison is analogous to the analyses made between the 
low- and high-penalty conditions in Experiment 2) yielded 
significant effects for procedure x trust F(l,47) = 4.27, p 
< .05, and a marginally significant procedure x trust x 
penalty interaction F(l,47) = 3.23, p = .075. The means for 
these data are depicted in Table 3. 
35 
This marginally significant procedure x trust x penalty 
interaction is a partial replication of the same interaction 
which was found in Experiment 2. Specifically, subjects in 
the trusting communities in both Experiment 1 and in the 
between-groups analysis of the penalty in the present 
experiment became relatively less adversarial as the penalty 
increased. However, these results were qualified by the 
analysis presented below. 
A second analysis of variance for procedural 
preferences was performed using all three levels of penalty 
as within-subjects variables.1 (The means for these data 
are depicted in Table 4.) This analysis revealed a 
significant between-groups effect of level of procedure x 
trust F(1,74) = 6.90, p < .02; that is, as we found in 
Experiments 1 and 2 as well as on the between-groups design, 
subjects in the trusting community were relatively less 
adversarial than subjects in the nontrusting community. 
Also found was a significant within-subjects effect of 
procedure x size of penalty F(2,148) = 14.18, p < .001—as 
the penalty increased in size, preference for the 
adversarial procedure also increased. In other words, when 
all three levels of the penalty were presented to the 
subjects (i.e., subjects understood the penalties in 
relation both to the offense and in relation to each other), 
we found a linear increase in preference for the adversarial 
procedure. This finding is not entirely in line with the 
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results of Experiments 1, 2, and the between-groups analysis 
(above) of these data; where in Experiment 1 we found no 
effect of penalty, and in Experiment 2 and in the between-
groups analysis we found subjects in the trusting community 
becoming less adversarial with increasing penalties. An 
analysis of only the low-penalty and moderate-penalty 
conditions (here as within-subjects factors) revealed 
significant effects for procedure x trust, F(l,74) = 5.34, p 
< .03; and a significant effect of procedure x penalty, 
F(l,74) = 15.40, p < .001; but no procedure x trust x 
penalty interaction was found. Thus, the within-subjects 
analysis of these data produce a different pattern of 
responding from the between-groups analysis above. 
Taken together, these different analyses portray an 
intriguing situation. Given the results of the within-
subjects analysis, these data can be understood from a 
different perspective. The significant within-subjects main 
effect for penalty reveals that the subjects became 
increasingly adversarial with increases in the magnitude of 
the penalty. And this effect was found in both trusting and 
nontrusting communities. Once the offense was made more 
explicit and the penalties anchored relative to the offense 
and to each other, the subjects responded to the situations 
using a tit-for-tat strategy which was not evidenced in the 
studies which used a between-groups design (e.g., 
Experiments 1 and 2 and the between-groups analysis of 
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Experiment 3). It appears as though, after being able to 
see the penalty in relational terms (i.e., in terms of 
several requests of differing magnitudes), subjects 
responded to what may have been perceived as the accuser's 
increasing aggressiveness or self-interest by becoming more 
adversarial themselves. 
Both the between-groups and the within-subjects results 
demonstrate interesting aspects of dispute situations. For 
example, subjects1 decisions in the between-group designs 
are analogous to situations—which often do occur—in which 
an individual has only a few bits of information upon which 
to make his or her decision (Kelley, 1972). (An individual 
may act upon limited information for several different 
reasons: (1) he/she is the type of person who does not seek 
out additional sources of information, (2) the situation 
itself limits what can be known, (3) the individual involved 
feels that he or she must act upon the situation quickly, 
(4) the individual feels that he/she knows the situation and 
accuser and therefore does not need to seek out more, etc.) 
And given this limited information, the individual is 
therefore not the perfect attributer, using instead what 
little information is at hand. In the case of our 
communities it is interesting that the subjects seemed to 
use aspects of the context to understand the meaning of the 
offense, the intention of the accuser, and of what the 
dispute situation could mean to them. As the amount of 
38 
information increased (as was the case in the within-
subjects design) the subjects had even more information upon 
which to base their decisions, and therefore did not infer 
the meaning of the offense and the severity of the penalty 
from the larger context. 
Thus, perhaps because of the shifting perceptions of 
the crime and the interpretation of the penalty, subjects in 
the between-groups designs did not understand the dispute 
situations in the full context of the possibilities of 
outcomes and the meaning of the offense. In Experiment 2, 
subjects in the trusting and low-penalty community may have 
perceived their accuser not as generous (for having asked 
for only a small compensation) but as even more adversarial 
for having taken the defendant to court over what may be a 
trivial matter. 
In other words, results from this experiment (the 
between-groups analysis in relation to the within-subjects 
analysis) seem to indicate that perceptions of the severity 
of the penalty and severity of the offense were in fact 
covarying across interrelatedness, trust, and magnitude of 
penalty in Experiments 1 and 2. Once these perceptions were 
anchored (in a within-subjects design), however, we obtained 
results which indicated that subjects in both communities, 
when allowed to understand the whole dispute within a more 
complete context, take a tit-for-tat stance in terms of 
litigation. These data do not support a confrontation-
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avoidance explanation, but provide a nice framework in which 
to begin to understand cross-contextual aspects of dispute 
resolution. Experiments 4 and 5 attempt to test directly 
(within the paradigms of Experiments 1 and 2) the 
assumptions that perceptions of the severity of the penalty 
and severity of the offense were covarying across 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
Method (Experiment 4) 
Subjects and Design 
42 female students from the introductory psychology 
class at the University of North Carolina-Greensboro 
participated in the study in return for experimental credit. 
The design included 2 between-groups factors: 
interrelatedness (multiplex and simplex) and size of penalty 
(low and high). All communities were trusting in nature. 
Materials 
The descriptions of the multiplex and simplex 
communities as well as the description of the dispute and 
penalties were exactly like those given in Experiments 1 and 
2. The scenarios were followed by two questions which asked 
subjects to indicate (1) how severe their accuser felt that 
the supposed offense was and (2) how severe, given that they 
were in fact guilty, the subjects felt the infringement was. 
Subjects indicated their responses on an 11-point scale. 
40 
Each subject read about and answered questions for only one 
of the four scenarios. 
Procedure 
Subjects were run in a large classroom in groups of 10 
to 15 each. The procedure was the same as that used in 
Experiments 1-3. 
Results and Discussion (Experiment 4) 
The analysis of variance on the accuser's perception of 
the severity of the offense revealed a significant effect 
for the size of the penalty F(l,38) = 6.98, p < .02; 
subjects believed that the accuser felt the offense 
associated with the high penalty was more serious than the 
offense associated with the low penalty. The analysis of 
variance for the subject's/defendant's perception of the 
severity of the offense revealed significant main effects 
for interrelatedness, F(l,38) = 9.16, p < .01; and size of 
penalty, F(l,38) = 6.70, p < .02. In other words, subjects 
believed that the offense committed in the multiplex 
community was more serious than the offense committed in the 
simplex one. Additionally, subjects also felt that the 
offense associated with the higher penalty was also more 
serious. 
These results indicate that the size of the penalty did 
indeed affect subjects' perceptions of the severity of the 
supposed offense. Furthermore, the interrelatedness of the 
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community also affected the perceived severity of the 
offense. Offenses committed in the multiplex communities 
were perceived as more severe than those committed in the 
simplex communities. Thus, in the between-groups design in 
Experiments 1, 2, and 32, perceptions of the severity of the 
offense were indeed covarying with the size of the penalty 
and interrelatedness. These perceptions, however, were also 
better anchored in the within-subjects design of Experiment 
3. 
Experiment 5 was undertaken to test perceptions of the 
severity of the penalty, and provides, in part, a 
manipulation check for "penalty". Additionally, however, 
Experiment 5 also tests the effects of interrelatedness on 
perceptions of the penalty; wherein, we would expect the 
consequences of litigating to be much higher in a multiplex 
than in a simplex community. 
Method (Experiment 5) 
Subjects and Design 
50 male and female students from the introductory 
psychology class at the University of North Carolina-
Greensboro participated in this experiment for research 
credit. Subjects were run in groups of 17-20. The twenty 
females and thirty males were distributed more or less 
evenly throughout the five experimental conditions. 
The design included five different communities which 
differed in degree of interrelatedness, level of trust, and 
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magnitude of the penalty. The communities were as follows: 
(1) multiplex, trusting and low in size of penalty, (2) 
simplex, trusting and having a high penalty associated with 
a guilty verdict, (3) simplex, trusting and having a low 
penalty, (4) simplex, nontrusting and having a low penalty 
associated with a guilty verdict, and (5) simplex, 
nontrusting, and high in size of penalty.3 
Materials 
The materials were presented the same way as in the 
previous experiments. Page one of the packet represented 
the description of one of five different communities. The 
descriptions of the communities were identical to those in 
Experiments 1 and 2; however, the last paragraph of the 
scenarios in Experiments 1 and 2 (the details of choosing 
different types of legal procedures) was omitted from these 
scenarios. 
The scenario on page one was followed by ten questions. 
Subjects responded to each question by indicating their 
answers on an 11-point scale. The two questions of interest 
asked subjects to rate the probability that a guilty verdict 
would change their position in the community and to rate the 
severity of the perception of consequences given a guilty 
verdict. Once again, subjects read about and answered the 
questions for only one of the five scenarios. 
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Results and Discussion Experiment 5 
The means for Experiment 5 (perceptions of the penalty 
and community) are depicted in Table 6. A one-way analysis 
of variance on the perceived severity of the consequences 
associated with a guilty verdict was conducted to obtain the 
mean square error term for computing the planned comparisons 
of interest. (The analysis of the question approached 
significance, F(4,45) = 2.17, p = .088.) Planned 
comparisons performed on only the trusting communities 
indicated that there was no significant difference between 
the multiplex, low-penalty community and the simplex, high-
penalty community, F < 1. The planned comparison performed 
on the multiplex, low-penalty and the simplex, low-penalty 
communities, however, indicated that there was a significant 
difference between the two communities, F(l,45) = 6.00, p 
<.05 . Consequences were perceived as more severe in the 
multiplex than in the simplex community—this despite the 
fact that both communities were described as having the same 
objectively low penalties associated with a guilty verdict. 
The analysis of variance for the likelihood that a 
guilty verdict would change one's position in the community 
was significant F(4,45) = 3.30, p <.02. Planned comparisons 
performed only on the trusting communities indicated that 
the multiplex, low-penalty community was not significantly 
different from the simplex, high-penalty community, F < 1. 
In other words, the subject's position in the community was 
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equally likely to change (as the result of a guilty verdict) 
in the low-penalty and multiplex scenario as in the high 
penalty and simplex scenario. Planned comparisons of the 
multiplex, low-penalty community with that of the simplex, 
low-penalty community revealed a marginally significant 
difference between the two, F(l, 45) = 3.93, p <.06; that 
is, subjects in the multiplex and low-penalty community 
believed that a guilty verdict was more likely to change 
their position in the community than did subjects in the 
simplex and low-penalty community. 
These results indicate that the perceived severity of 
the penalty increased with the size of the penalty. 
Additionally, increases in the interrelatedness of the 
community 1) increased the perceived severity of the crime 
and 2) increased the risk to the subject's position in the 
community as well. Therefore, increased interrelatedness 
(as in the multiplex communities) increased some of the 
other (perhaps social consequences) associated with the 
transgression. This, in turn, increased the severity of the 
penalty (the likelihood that the subject's position in the 
community would change), which thereby may have also 
decreased the perceptions of the crime's severity. Thus, 
committing a crime in the low-penalty but highly 
interrelated community was more likely to change both the 
perceived severity of the offense and therefore the 
subject's position in the community than if the crime had 
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been committed in the less interrelated community (with low 
objective consequences). Interestingly, committing an 
objectively low-penaltv offense in the highly interrelated 
community was equally likely to change the subject's 
position in their community as committing a high-penaltv 
offense in a less interrelated community. Hence, through 
changing the interrelatedness we were able to alter 
perceptions of the penalty's severity. 
Together, Experiments 4 and 5 indicate that the 
communities (of which the subjects imagined themselves 
members) affected their perceptions of the penalty and 
offense. This has interesting implications for dispute 
resolution as addressed by the between-groups designs in 
Experiments 1 and 2. For example, given a limited set of 
information to act upon (as is not unusual in real-life 
situations), it appears that aspects of an individual's 
context affect and are used in the individual's decisions. 
Thus, the context in which a person finds him- or herself 
contributes to decisions of dispute resolution through its 
affect on the perceptions of the nature of the severity of 
the dispute and the severity of its outcomes. (By 
implication, the nature of the context—and hence of the 
offense and penalty—gives the subject information about the 
nature of the accuser.) 
Thus, in the between-groups designs, consequences and 
offense were covarying with interrelatedness and size of 
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penalty; only when the offense was stated more explicitly 
and the penalties interpreted in relation to each other 
(e.g., the within-subjects design) were these perceptions 
"anchored". And only when this occurred did we find 
subjects using a matching or "tit-for-tat" strategy in which 
they showed a linear and increasing preference for the 
adversarial procedure as the penalty increased in size. 
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CHAPTER IV 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Five studies were conducted to (1) determine the roles 
which interrelatedness, trust, and magnitude of penalty play 
in procedural preferences and to (2) investigate the use of 
a laboratory community for the study of dispute resolution. 
Interrelatedness (multiplex and simplex types of 
interrelations) alone was not solely responsible for 
producing different procedural preferences. It did, 
however, mediate the perceptions of the penalty and offense; 
subjects in the multiplex communities perceived the offense 
and the consequences and potential outcomes of engaging in 
litigation to be more severe than subjects in the simplex 
communities. Apparently violations of standards and codes 
of conducts in communities which are highly interrelated, 
long-standing, and less permeable (i.e., members have little 
mobility, usually planning to remain in the community for 
long periods of time) are perceived as being more 
threatening to the fabric of the group and (importantly) to 
one's position in the group. Violations in less 
interrelated and more permeable, "looser" groups may 
likewise be perceived as less severe since one need not be 
as concerned about interacting with the same (perhaps 
unpleasant) people for years on end—always having the 
48 
option, if worse comes to worse, of leaving. Hence 
violations of community standards in a simplex community 
would be perceived as relatively less severe. 
Interrelatedness, therefore, has the interesting effect 
of reducing more "aggressive" interactions (e.g., the choice 
of an adversarial hearing procedure to litigate) by 
mediating group members' perceptions of the severity of the 
offense. Furthermore, interrelatedness also affects the 
perception of the potential threat which a transgression 
poses to the harmony of the group and to the security of the 
individual's position within the group. Thus, out of fear 
of rejection, community members will be less willing and 
likely to be aggressive in dispute situations. 
Interestingly this interpretation corresponds roughly to a 
confrontation-avoidance explanation (Leung, 1987) as one 
mechanism responsible for the relative nonadversarialness 
witnessed in members of collective societies. A fear of 
rejection or the fear of damaging one's position or 
reputation in one's community may be one of the reasons why 
people avoid confrontations. 
The level of trust, regardless of the interrelatedness 
of the community, affected procedural preferences. Subjects 
in the nontrusting communities were consistently more 
adversarial than subjects in the trusting communities. 
Thus, its seems that interpersonal and ingroup trust may be 
an aspect of the collectivism-individualism dimension which 
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mediates the ways in which a person chooses to settle a 
dispute. And although we derived the idea of "trust" from 
this cultural dimension, it seems to mediate preferences not 
through confrontation-avoidance, but through a process 
conceptually more akin to animosity-reduction. For example, 
an "animosity-reduction-type" process may operate by 
mediating the defendant's perceptions of the intentions,of 
his/her accuser; so that, for example, the defendant in a 
trusting community will be more likely to have positive 
expectations of his/her accuser and of the whole legal 
system in general. And if participants have more positive 
expectations of one another's intentions, then they will be 
less likely to even perceive the dispute as being a dispute. 
Thus, animosity may be avoided or reduced not because 
the litigants choose to be cooperative in settling the 
dispute, but because they would be less likely to interpret 
the situation as a dispute in the first place. In a 
trusting environment, the defendant will probably be much 
more likely to allow that his/her accuser has a good reason 
for bringing the issue to bear; whereas in a nontrusting 
environment, even the best of intentions may be interpreted 
as self-serving (from the very outset), and litigants will 
likewise behave towards each other in a less cooperative 
manner. In this manner, animosity will be reduced or 
induced at the level of interpretation of intentions4. 
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Furthermore, if a defendant in a dispute were more 
likely to have a positive interpretation of his/her 
accuser's intentions (as in the trusting community), the 
defendant may be more likely to consider the extent to which 
he/she may possibly be at fault (at least partially) or what 
he/she may have done to foster that belief in another. 
Another aspect of "trust" as it was portrayed in our 
scenarios is that the trusting and nontrusting communities 
represented extreme (but certainly not unheard of) instances 
of the variable. We were, however, able to make subtle 
comparisons within trust through an examination of the 
effects of interrelatedness on trust. Thus, in the trusting 
communities alone, we found differences in perceptions and 
procedural preferences depending upon whether the communitiy 
was multiplex and trusting or simplex and trusting. This 
seems to be an indication that the strength of "trust" 
manipulation was not absolutely overpowering. 
Another possible concern about our manipulation may 
center on the positivity and negativity of the trusting and 
nontrusting communities respectively. In other words, 
perhaps the differences in procedural preferences may have 
been due to the overall positivity or negativity of the 
community. We find evidence to the contrary when we examine 
the variables of penalty and interrelatedness. For example, 
in the simplex-trusting community, we found subjects to be 
relatively less nonadversarial in the low penalty condition 
and relatively more nonadversarial in the high penalty 
condition; thereby indicating that differences in 
preferences were not the result of positivity-negativity 
alone. Additionally, the preferences evidenced between 
multiplex-trusting and simplex-trusting communities also 
argue against a positivity-negativity explanation. 
Finally, the variable of trust also interacted with 
that of the magnitude of the penalty. And two interesting 
effects were found for "penalty"—one as revealed by the 
within-subjects design and the other as revealed by the 
between-groups design. First, in the within-subjects 
design, we found that once the offense and penalty were 
anchored, subjects in both the trusting and the nontrusting 
communities used the same tit-for-tat strategies. Subjects 
in both communities preferred the adversarial procedure more 
as the size of the requested compensation increased. This 
pattern of responding was not apparent when (1) the offense 
was less, explicit and (2) the penalty was not presented in 
the context of the offense and in relation to several 
potential sizes of requests. In other words, when the 
subjects had a broader understanding of the context of the 
dispute, they were able to be more "perfect" attributers and 
thus reacted to increasing levels of cost in a predictable 
manner. 
Specifically, knowing about the different sizes of 
requests in relation to the explicit offense, enabled the 
subjects to determine, through implication, the 
adversarialness of their accuser. The more demanding the 
accuser and the more outlandish the demand, the more 
adversarial the defendant. It is important to note that 
this process takes place within and in relation to the 
community (interrelatedness and level of trust) as well. 
So, for example, in the simplex, trusting, and low-penalty 
community, the small demand was perceived as unreasonable 
because of the subject's expectation that a member of such a 
wonderful community—unless an aggressive person—would not 
take a community member to court over such a trivial matter. 
Hence, a person could actually demand a small compensation 
for an offense and still be perceived as aggressive.5 Thus, 
until the penalties were anchored in the within-subjects 
design, attributions ranged from interpretations of whether 
the issue being disputed was a trivial one or whether the 
accuser was in fact being nonadversarial and generous. 
Thus, all elements of the context provide information which 
the subjects used in their determination of how adversarial 
or nonadversarial they would be. As such, an outlandish and 
aggressive demand would be interpreted as being more 
unjustified and inconsistent in a trusting than in a 
nontrusting group. Thus, while the level of trust and 
interrelatedness of one's community would mediate how 
adversarial a person might be, these variables would not 
change the "tit-for-tat" strategy or process—especially 
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after a more complete context for the dispute is provided 
and known. 
By the same token, we found in the between-groups 
experiments that given a limited range of information, 
subjects reached conclusions and made attributions based on 
single bits of information (Kelley, 1972). And just as we 
often seek out information upon which to base our judgments, 
there are certainly many instances in which we do not. 
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate how and what kinds of 
attributions subjects make when limited in their knowledge. 
In sum, when the severity of a crime or offense is not 
absolutely clear (as is often the case), litigants will seek 
more information, using the whole community and legal system 
as information which helps them to determine how to proceed 
with settling a dispute. Thus, the different features of 
one particular hearing procedure versus another are but a 
small part of the total information which a person uses in 
deciding how to litigate. 
Finally, with regard to the laboratory community, all 
five experiments produced understandable but different 
preferences and therefore demonstrated the success of the 
microculture in testing aspects of dispute resolution. 
Specifically, these communities enabled us to investigate, 
through systematic manipulation, variables which may be 
relevant to a full understanding of procedural justice. 
Thus, one implication of these studies is a paradigm based 
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upon the idea of a person x situation interaction may indeed 
provide an additional method of studying dispute resolution. 
Our success in producing different procedural preferences is 
an indication that our subjects were capable of freeing 
themselves from their contexts and responding to dispute 
situations as members of different communities. 
In conclusion, in addition to showing the effects of 
interrelatedness, trust, and magnitude of penalty, we were 
also successful in creating a microculture in which we could 
examine different variables of dispute resolution. Our 
approach of the microcultural examination of contextual 
variables coupled with cross-cultural studies, should 
increase our theoretical understanding of dispute 
resolution. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. In other words, the "between-groups" design explained 
above was a between and within (mixed) design, with penalty 
considered a between subjects variable (i.e., only the 
subject's response to the first penalty scenario was 
analyzed) so that the design included two between factors: 
trust (trusting or nontrusting) and size of the penalty 
(low, moderate, or high); and one within-subjects variable: 
procedural preference (adversarial and nonadversarial). The 
"within-subjects" design explained here is also a between 
and within mixed design; however, this time all the penalty 
scenarios which were presented to the subject were included 
in the analysis. Therefore, the design now included only 
one between-groups factor of trust (trusting or nontrusting) 
and two within-subjects factors: penalty (low, moderate, 
and high) and preference. 
2. That is, for Experiment 3, the first analysis was a 
between-groups analysis. 
3. The long-standing community had only a low 
consequence condition since the comparisons of interest were 
the between this community and the low and high consequence 
conditions of the less interrelated communities. 
4. This is a significant point as it may help explain, 
at least in part, why people from some societies (e.g., 
Chinese and Japanese) choose the nonadversarial model for 
small as well as serious offenses. For example, Tanabe 
(1963) points out that for the Japanese, lawyers were once 
looked upon with disdain, and merely going to court was a 
disgrace—no matter what the severity of the crime. Thus, 
the variable of trust, within a community typified by 
multiplex relations, produced different preferences for 
judicial procedures. Subjects in communities high in trust 
preferred the nonadversarial procedure to a greater degree 
than subjects from communities high in distrust. Is there, 
nonetheless, a scenario or community in which cost or 
consequences would affect preferences for different 
procedural models? 
5. 10 undergraduates were asked, in a within-subjects 
design, to indicate how likely it would be for the average 
person in each of four different communites (trusting-low 
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penalty, trusting-high penalty, nontrusting-low penalty, and 
nontrusting-high penalty) to take someone to court. We 
obtained significant main effects for trust, F(l,9) = 32.43, 
p < .001 and penalty, F(l,9) = 10.44, p < .02. Subjects 
felt that the average person in the nontrusting communities 
were more likely to litigate than the average person in the 
trusting communities. Furthermore, subjects felt that a 
person in the high penalty condition would be more likely to 
litigate than someone in the low penalty condition. 
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Appendix A: Descriptions of the Multiplex communities 
Trusting community—Low penalty 
We would like you to imagine that you have grown up and 
plan to remain in the community which is described below. 
It is a rather small community and you know and are known to 
most of its members. Your community and its legal system 
are made up of very fine, upstanding citizens. There is a 
feeling of trust here; you trust your neighbors, and they, 
in turn, trust you. Honesty, integrity, and concern for 
others are values which are very important to you and your 
neighbors, with many of the citizens of your community 
supporting and volunteering time in service organizations 
such as the Red Cross, the march of Dimes, organizations for 
the homeless, and neighborhood watches. Furthermore, people 
know that they can depend on you and you on them—in cases 
of emergency as well as for little everyday matters. These 
factors have led to the development of a strong sense of 
neighborhood pride and unity; and these are indeed qualities 
which you all strive to preserve. Likewise the participants 
in the following scenarios, that is the judge, lawyers, and 
the legal system in general, also represent and strive to 
uphold the qualities of this community. 
Now, we would like you to imagine that you are involved 
in a dispute with another person. This other person has 
charged you with infringing upon this person's property. 
The other person, the accuser in this dispute, has asked 
that you pay damages for your infringement, but you do not 
believe that you have done anything wrong. Some cases are 
public and some are private. Whether a case is public or 
private is determined randomly. Your case will be a 
private, closed trial.1 Consequently, your community at 
large will be unaware of the procedure, progress, and 
outcome of your trial. If you were found guilty, you would 
stand to lose an insignificant amount of your material 
assets. 
As the accused, you have some choice in deciding how 
your dispute will be resolved; that is, what procedure will 
be used to determine whether the other person's accusations 
are justified and whether you will have to pay damages. We 
are going to present you with two ways of resolving your 
dispute and deciding whether the charges against you are 
correct. Read each of the procedures carefully, as though 
they were actually going to be used to decide whether you 
should pay damages; try to imagine yourself in the 
situations described here. After you have had a chance to 
look at the two procedures, we would like you to answer some 
questions about the procedures. 
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Trusting community—High penalty 
We would like you to imagine that you have grown up and 
plan to remain in the community which is described below. 
It is a rather small community and you know and are known to 
most of its members. Your community and its legal system 
are made up of very fine, upstanding citizens. There is a 
feeling of trust here; you trust your neighbors, and they, 
in turn, trust you. Honesty, integrity, and concern for 
others are values whidh are very important to you and your 
neighbors, with many of the citizens of your community 
supporting and volunteering time in service organizations 
such as the Red Cross, the march of Dimes, organizations for 
the homeless, and neighborhood watches. Furthermore, people 
know that they can depend on you and you on them—in cases 
of emergency as well as for little everyday matters. These 
factors have led to the development of a strong sense of 
neighborhood pride and unity; and these are indeed qualities 
which you all strive to preserve. Likewise the participants 
in the following scenarios, that is the judge, lawyers, and 
the legal system in general, also represent and strive to 
uphold the qualities of this community. 
Now, we would like you to imagine that you are involved 
in a dispute with another person. This other person has 
charged you with infringing upon this person's property. 
The other person, the accuser in this dispute, has asked 
that you pay damages for your infringement, but you do not 
believe that you have done anything wrong. Some cases are 
public and some are private. Whether a case is public or 
private is determined randomly. Your case will be a 
private, closed trial. Consequently, your community at 
large will be unaware of the procedure, progress, and 
outcome of your trial. If you were found guilty, you would 
stand to lose a significant amount of your material assets 
which could include a great deal of your savings. 
As the accused, you have some choice in deciding how 
your dispute will be resolved; that is, what procedure will 
be used to determine whether the other person's accusations 
are justified and whether you will have to pay damages. We 
are going to present you with two ways of resolving your 
dispute and deciding whether the charges against you are 
correct. Read each of the procedures carefully, as though 
they were actually going to be used to decide whether you 
should pay damages; try to imagine yourself in the 
situations described here. After you have had a chance to 
look at the two procedures, we would like you to answer some 
questions about the procedures. 
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Nontrusting community—Low penalty 
We would like you to imagine that you have grown up and 
plan to remain in the community which is described below. 
It is a rather small community and you know and are known to 
most of its members. Your community and its legal system 
are made up of people of questionable character. There is a 
feeling of distrust here, and crimes are not an uncommon 
occurrence. The citizens of your community are largely 
concerned with getting ahead, "earning a buck", and looking 
out for number one. You are aware that some of your 
neighbors are racially prejudiced (some perhaps even having 
past associations with the Ku Klux Klan). Businessmen in 
your community are known to be corrupt. Many of the 
politicians are generally reputed to take kick-backs and 
work for various special interest groups. People keep to 
themselves—it's the safest thing to do. These factors have 
all contributed to the feelings of distrust and lack of 
unity which pervade your community. Likewise, the 
participants in the following scenarios, that is, the judge, 
the lawyers, and the legal system in general, also reflect 
these feelings and represent the general character of your 
community. 
Now, we would like you to imagine that you are involved 
in a dispute with another person. This other person has 
charged you with infringing upon this person's property. 
The other person, the accuser in this dispute, has asked 
that you pay damages for your infringement, but you do not 
believe that you have done anything wrong. Some cases are 
public and some are private. Whether a case is public or 
private is determined randomly. Your case will be a 
private, closed trial.1 Consequently, your community at 
large will be unaware of the procedure, progress, and 
outcome of your trial. If you were found guilty, you would 
stand to lose an insignificant amount of your material 
assets. 
As the accused, you have some choice in deciding how 
your dispute will be resolved; that is, what procedure will 
be used to determine whether the other person's accusations 
are justified and whether you will have to pay damages. We 
are going to present you with two ways of resolving your 
dispute and deciding whether the charges against you are 
correct. Read each of the procedures carefully, as though 
they were actually going to be used to decide whether you 
should pay damages; try to imagine yourself in the 
situations described here. After you have had a chance to 
look at the two procedures, we would like you to answer some 
questions about the procedures. 
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Nontrusting community—High penalty 
We would like you to imagine that you have grown up and 
plan to remain in the community which is described below. 
It is a rather small community and you know and are known to 
most of its members. Your community and its legal system 
are made up of people of questionable character. There is a 
feeling of distrust here, and crimes are not an uncommon 
occurrence. The citizens of your community are largely 
concerned with getting ahead, "earning a buck", and looking 
out for number one. You are aware that some of your 
neighbors are racially prejudiced (some perhaps even having 
past associations with the Ku Klux Klan). Businessmen in 
your community are known to be corrupt. Many of the 
politicians are generally reputed to take kick-backs and 
work for various special interest groups. People keep to 
themselves—it's the safest thing to do. These factors have 
all contributed to the feelings of distrust and lack of 
unity which pervade your community. Likewise, the 
participants in the following scenarios, that is, the judge, 
the lawyers, and the legal system in general, also reflect 
these feelings and represent the general character of your 
community. 
Now, we would like you to imagine that you are involved 
in a dispute with another person. This other person has 
charged you with infringing upon this person's property. 
The other person, the accuser in this dispute, has asked 
that you pay damages for your infringement, but you do not 
believe that you have done anything wrong. Some cases are 
public and some are private. Whether a case is public or 
private is determined randomly. Your case will be a 
private, closed trial.1 Consequently, your community at 
large will be unaware of the procedure, progress, and 
outcome of your trial. If you were found guilty, you would 
stand to lose a significant amount of your material assets 
which could include a great deal of your savings. 
As the accused, you have some choice in deciding how 
your dispute will be resolved; that is, what procedure will 
be used to determine whether the other person's accusations 
are justified and whether you will have to pay damages. We 
are going to present you with two ways of resolving your 
dispute and deciding whether the charges against you are 
correct. Read each of the procedures carefully, as though 
they were actually going to be used to decide whether you 
should pay damages; try to imagine yourself in the 
situations described here. After you have had a chance to 
look at the two procedures, we would like you to answer some 
questions about the procedures. 
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1Some subjects in both Experiments 1 and 2 were told that 
their community would be aware of the proceedings and 
outcome of their trial while other subjects in these 
experiments were told that their community would be unaware 
of it. The variable "awareness," however, is not reported 
since it did not affect preferences. The data were analyzed 
without the variable; and statistically, the results did not 
differ when the awareness variable was included in the 
analysis. 
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Appendix B: Hearing procedures 
Hearing Procedure J 
Judge. Under this procedure, the dispute will be 
resolved in a hearing held by a judge with the help of one 
investigator. The judge will base his decision on the 
information supplied by the investigator; he may not 
consider information from any other source. At the hearing, 
the judge may ask questions about what the investigator has 
presented. Following the investigator's presentation, the 
judge will close the hearing, decide on and announce his 
decision. 
Investigator. There is one investigator, who is 
assigned to this case by the judge. The investigator is 
working for the judge and not for either of the parties to 
the dispute. 
The duty of this investigator will be to find out the 
facts of the case from both the accuser (the other person) 
and the accused (you). He will ask the accuser and the 
accused questions about the facts of the case, and he will 
also collect information about the case on his own. At the 
hearing the investigator will present a report to 
the judge containing the facts he has found. The 
investigator has the responsibility to decide which facts go 
in the report and which do not. 
Parties. Before the hearing, the accuser and the 
accused will provide the facts requested by the 
investigator. 
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Hearing Procedure L 
Judge, Under this procedure, the dispute will be 
resolved in a hearing by a judge with the help of two 
investigators, who will represent the two parties to the 
dispute. The judge will base his decision on the 
information supplied by the investigators; he may not 
consider information from any other source. At the hearing, 
the judge may ask questions about what each investigator has 
presented. Following the investigators' presentations, the 
judge will close the hearing, decide on, and announce his 
decision. 
Investigator. The two investigators, who are chosen by 
the two parties to the dispute, are very similar. The 
investigators are working for the parties to the dispute and 
not for the judge. 
The duty of each investigator will be to find out the 
facts of the case favorable to the party represented by the 
investigator. He will ask the accuser and the accused 
questions about the facts of the case, and he will also 
collect information about the case on his own. At the 
hearing each investigator will present a report containing 
the facts he has found for his side of the case. The 
investigators may disagree with each other's presentations 
by asking and answering questions of one another. The 
investigators have the responsibility to decide which facts 
go in the reports and which do not. 
Parties. Before the hearing, the accuser and the 
accused will each meet with their representative to discuss 
the facts of the case. 
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Appendix C: Tables 
Table 1 
Procedural Preference as a Function of High 
Interrelatedness. Trust. and Penalty 
Penalty 
Community High Low 
Trusting 
Adversarial 13.39 13.28 
Nonadversarial 9.60 8.86 
Nontrusting 
Adversarial 
Nonadversarial 
13.42 
6.03 
13.69 
5.51 
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Table 2 
Procedural Preference as a Function of Low Interrelatedness. 
Trust. and Penalty 
Penalty 
Community High Low 
Trusting 
Adversarial 12.83 15.90 
Nonadversarial 10.18 6.58 
Nontrusting 
Adversarial 
Nonadversarial 
14.51 
6.73 
14.17 
6.80 
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Table 3 
Preferences as a Function of Trust and Penalty—Penalty as a 
Between-groups Factor 
Penalty 
Community Low Moderate High 
Trusting 
Adversarial 12.5 10.5 13.2 
Nonadversarial 9.6 11.2 12.2 
Nontrusting 
Adversarial 13.0 15.4 15.2 
Nonadversarial 9.5 6.5 9.2 
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Table 4 
Preferences as a Function of Trust and Penalty—Penalty as a 
Within-subi ects Factor 
Penalty 
Moderate High 
12.7 
10.0 
13 
9 
4 
2 
14.9 
7.4 
16, 
6, 
1 
6 
Community Low 
Trusting 
Adversarial 11.2 
Nonadversarial 12.2 
Nontrusting 
Adversarial 13.5 
Nonadversarial 9.6 
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Table 5 
Perceptions of Severity of Offense as a Function of 
Interrelatedness and Penalty 
Accuser•s 
Perception of 
Severity of Offense 
Subject's 
Perception of 
Severity of Offense 
Multiplex 
Low Penalty • 7.55 5.27 
High Penalty 9.09 8.18 
Simplex 
Low Penalty 6.75 3.63 
High Penalty 8.42 4.92 
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Table 6 
Perceptions of Offense and Community as a Function of Trust. 
Interrelatedness. and Penalty 
Change position Perceived severity 
Community in community consequences 
MULTIPLEX 
Trusting 
Low Penalty 7.15 6.9 
SIMPLEX 
Trusting 
Low Penalty 4.7 4.0 
High Penalty 7.15 6.5 
Nontrusting 
Low Penalty 3.95 5.45 
High Penalty 7.25 6.85 
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Appendix D: Raw Data 
Experiment 1—Multiplex community 
Trusting—Low penalty Trusting—High penalty 
S No. Nonadv Adv S No. Nonadv Adv 
1 5 15 1 15 7 
2 0 15 2 20 10 
3 10 15 3 8 16 
4 8 15 4 16 10 
5 18 5 5 6 11 
6 17 12 6 6 15 
7 0 10 7 15 19 
8 12 19 8 0 20 
9 17 15 9 9 12 
10 8 12 10 1 15 
11 15 5 11 5 15 
12 8 20 12 17 5 
13 12 5 13 5 15 
14 5 12 14 15 6 
15 10 15 15 10 15 
16 5 15 16 10 15 
17 5 15 17 10 15 
18 0 20 18 12 10 
19 15 5 19 15 20 
20 1 20 20 5 15 
21 10 17 21 10 7 
22 15 14 22 7 13 
23 1 18 23 10 19 
24 8 17 24 3 20 
25 2 18 25 10 17 
26 7 15 26 18 5 
27 15 12 27 5 15 
28 5 15 28 3 16 
29 10 15 29 10.5 14.5 
30 17 5 30 18 10 
31 12 5 31 15 5 
32 10 17 32 0 20 
33 2 18 33 15 7 
34 15 8 34 2 18.5 
35 5 14 35 3 15 
36 4 5 36 6 14 
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(Experiment 1, cont.) 
Nontrusting—Low penalty Nontrusting—High penalty 
S No. Nonadv AdV S No. Nonadv AdV 
1 8 13 1 5 15 
2 2 18 2 5 18 
3 10 15 3 2 10 
4 2 15 4 2 18 
5 7 14 5 15 5 
6 0 12 6 0 20 
7 1 10 7 5 17 
8 5 17 8 5 15 
9 12.5 10 9 5 12 
10 0 15 10 0 18 
11 2 8 11 8 15 
12 5 17 12 5 15 
13 3 13 13 8 15 
14 7 15 14 9 8 
15 10 15 15 5 15 
16 4 12 16 20 5 
17 2 14 17 8 13 
18 5 15 18 3 13 
19 0 18 19 0 10 
20 5 20 20 17 14 
21 13 6 21 3 20 
22 0 20 22 6 17 
23 15 5 23 5 18 
24 18 11 24 10 4 
25 3 19 25 0 20 
26 1 0 26 8 3 
27 0 12 27 0 10 
28 20 18 28 0 15 
29 0 10 29 10 19 
30 7 15 30 16.5 5 
31 2 8 31 3 15 
32 5 15 32 8.5 10 
33 4 16 33 10 16 
34 0 17 34 4 13 
35 10 20 35 1 12 
36 10 15 36 5 15 
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Experiment 2—Simplex community 
Trusting—Low penalty 
S No. Nonadv Adv 
1 10 17 
2 7 18 
3 3 19 
4 12 18 
5 5 15 
6 3 16 
7 10 10 
8 10 10 
9 16 8 
10 2 16 
11 2 20 
12 14 5 
13 4.5 17 
14 10 8 
15 15 10 
16 0 20 
17 10 10 
18 4 10 
19 10 17 
20 10 8 
21 3 15.5 
22 4 12.3 
23 14 18 
24 8 10 
25 10 19 
26 0 17 
27 2 18.8 
28 10 10 
29 2 20 
30 0 15 
Trusting—High penalty 
S NO. Nonadv Adv 
1 2 18 
2 14 9 
3 12 16 
4 10 10 
5 0 16 
6 17 11 
7 1 19 
8 17 10 
9 4 16 
10 9 19 
11 4 16 
12 20 5 
13 10 17 
14 0 17 
15 2 19 
16 5 12 
17 10 15 
18 15.5 10 
19 15 10 
20 13 4.5 
21 14 9 
22 12 18 
23 8 12 
24 2 10 
25 0 0 
26 5 20 
27 10 18 
28 16.5 8.5 
29 8 15 
30 4.5 14.5 
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(Experiment 2, cont.) 
Nontrusting—Low penalty Nontrusting—High penalty 
S No. Nonadv Adv S NO. Nonadv Adv 
1 1 20 1 2 16 
2 17 9 2 0.5 19.5 
3 6.5 17.5 3 5 15 
4 8 13 4 10 15 
5 5 14 5 6 13 
6 12 5 6 7 12 
7 0 10 7 4.5 11.5 
8 12 6 8 10 15 
9 5.5 10 9 5 18 
10 10 12.5 10 0 17.5 
11 1 14 11 10 5 
12 3 14 12 20 10 
13 3 17 13 12 15 
14 15.5 10 14 11.3 11.3 
15 10 20 15 10 0 
16 3 8 16 4 17 
17 10 17 17 2 18 
18 6.5 12.5 18 4.5 15.5 
19 9 11.5 19 5 15 
20 6 16 20 5.5 15.5 
21 13 10 21 5 18 
22 17 7 22 15 4 
23 10 13 23 3 17 
24 4.5 20 24 3 16 
25 2 18 25 5 16 
26 0 20 26 6 16 
27 10 8 27 5 15 
28 4 18 28 14 5.5 
29 14 10 29 0 20 
30 2 17 
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Experiment 3—Within-subiects. penalty 
Trusting Community 
Level of Penalty 
Low Moderate High 
S No. Nonadv Adv Nonadv Adv Nonadv Adv 
1 15 7* 9 17 3 20 
2 10 20 13 20 13 20 
3 2 17 9 10 5 17 
4 10 16 4 1 1 3 
5 10 6 10 6 7 9 
6 9 11 7 14 5 16 
7 3 18 5 17 1 20 
8 10 15 10 16 7 20 
9 17 8 9 15 5 19 
10 16 6 16 8 18 5 
11 14 10 14 10 14 10 
12 3 18 3 18 3 18 
13 6 10 8 14 6 13 
14 16 8 15 10 3 17 
15 5 10 5 10 5 10 
16 15 5 16 5 15 5 
17 13 4 7 13 6 17 
18 19 3 19 3 19 3 
19 7 13 6 14 7 13 
20 9 10 7 12 9 10 
21 20 5 18 10 3 20 
22 19 9 17 9 9 15 
23 16 4 16 5 16 4 
24 7 16 7 16 7 17 
25 15 6 6 15 6 15 
26 15 7 7 15 6 15 
27 17 12 2 17 4 16 
28 15 20 5 20 10 20 
29 12 20 10 20 14 20 
30 14 10 17 14 14 10 
31 18 3 18 3 16 3 
32 18 13 14 5 16 7 
33 16 8 5 17 12 9 
34 10 17 10 17 10 18 
35 7 19 4 20 12 18 
36 15 6 14 7 14 7 
37 10 18 10 18 10 17 
38 8 13 7 15 9 16 
39 15 17 10 19 17 10 
*Boldfaced numbers indicate the first scenario of each 
packet. 
(Experiment 3, cont.) 
Nontrusting Community 
Level of Penalty 
Low Moderate Hiah 
S No. Nonadv Adv Nonadv Adv Nonadv Adv 
1 3 19* 4 18 7 19 
2 12 18 13 18 2 3 
3 9 15 7 18 5 19 
4 17 6 2 20 3 20 
5 4 18 3 18 3 18 
6 7 18 1 18 1 20 
7 13 6 6 15 3 18 
8 7 14 7 14 7 15 
9 10 16 9 13 16 9 
10 5 15 5 15 7 16 
11 18 5 10 18 3 20 
12 9 6 7 17 1 18 
13 3 17 6 14 14 6 
14 4 18 4 16 2 18 
15 3 18 3 18 3 18 
16 17 6 6 15 3 17 
17 18 19 12 19 18 13 
18 10 11 3 18 3 18 
19 14 10 5 17 6 20 
20 18 9 18 9 10 18 
21 1 20 1 13 1 20 
22 5 19 7 13 3 17 
23 2 18 3 18 1 20 
24 4 14 7 15 4 15 
25 10 20 10 15 10 17 
26 15 10 6 14 15 5 
27 20 7 20 11 14 20 
28 15 6 18 3 12 17 
29 3 17 3 18 3 17 
30 10 18 10 18 10 17 
31 14 10 14 10 14 10 
32 8 14 9 15 7 18 
33 17 10 4 10 5 20 
34 15 7 15 7 15 10 
35 5 16 5 16 5 15 
36 8 13 7 11 7 15 
37 3 18 3 18 3 18 
*Boldfaced numbers indicate the 
packet. 
first scenario of each 
Experiment 4—Perceptions of Severity of Offense 
-
MULTIPLEX COMMUNITIES 
LOW Penalty Hicrh penalty 
No Accuser1 s Subj ect's S NO Accuser1s Subject's 
Percept1 n Percept'n Percept1n Percept'n 
1 8 10 1 10 8 
2 7 6 2 10 10 
3 9 3 3 10 7 
4 7 3 4 10 8 
5 9 3 5 9 10 
6 3 7 6 7 9 
7 9 6 7 8 9 
8 9 9 8 6 8 
9 4 3 9 10 10 
10 8 7 10 10 8 
11 10 1 11 10 3 
SIMPLEX COMMUNITIES 
LOW Penalty Hiah penalty 
NO AccTiser' s Subj ect1s S No Accuser1s Subj ect1s 
Percept1n PorcGpt1n Percept1n Percept1n 
1 10 1 1 6 8 
2 5 1 2 9 3 
3 8 6 3 10 8 
4 2 2 4 9 3 
5 9 3 5 9 4 
6 8 4 6 8 2 
7 9 9 7 8 2 
8 3 3 8 8 7 
9 9 2 
10 8 5 
11 9 10 
12 8 5 
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Experiment 5—Perceptions of Severity of Penalties 
SIMPLEX-TRUSTING COMMUNITIES 
Low Penalty Hicrtl penalty 
S No Change Perceived S No Change Perceived 
Position Conseqnc Position Conseqnc 
1 2 2 1 5 7 
2 8 7 2 6 5 
3 4 5 3 10 10 
4 7 8 4 7 5 
5 10 5 5 8.5 8 
6 4 7 6 10 7 
7 2 2 7 9 6 
8 0 0 8 8 6 
9 9 4 9 3 7 
10 1 0 10 5 4 
SIMPLEX-nonTRUSTING COMMUNITIES 
Low Penalty Hiah penalty 
S NO Change Perceived S NO Change Perceived 
Position Conseqnc Position Conseqn 
1 10 8 1 8 8 
2 6 6 2 10 8 
3 1 10 3 10 6 
4 2.5 4.5 4 9.5 8.5 
5 7 4 5 7 4 
6 5 7 6 8 8 
7 1 5 7 6 8 
8 1 0 8 5 2 
9 0 3 9 6 8 
10 6 7 10 3 0 
MULTIPLEX-TRUSTING COMMUNITIES 
Low Penalty 
S No Change Perceived 
Position Conseqnc 
14 0 
2 7 6 
3 8 6 
4 9.5 9.5 
5 5 3 
6 5 10 
7 8 8 
8 7 7 
9 9 10 
10 9 9.5 
